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ABSTRACT
This article was presented at the Penn State Law Review's
Symposium, Breach of the Public (Dis)Trust. The article examines the
potential impact of the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in
McDonnell v. United States. The analysis first focuses on a narrow
reading of McDonnell, treating it as part of the Court's general approach
to issues of statutory construction. However, there is a possible broader
reading of McDonnell, which has the potential to be highly significant as
applied to anticorruption prosecutions, federalism concerns, and the
"criminalization of politics" critique. After examining a broader view of
McDonnell, the article delves into whether the case is indicative of
broader themes in the treatment of corruption, or potential corruption, in
both the electoral and governance contexts. Next the article will analyze
the surprisingly small amount of academic commentary on McDonnell,
despite media interest, as well as the initial judicial interpretations and
applications of the decision. The article concludes with a review of the
many helpful contributions made at the Symposium, reflecting a
diversity of views about McDonnell. These views are an extremely
helpful starting point for grappling with the decision's uncertainties.
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I. INTRODUCTION-A BROAD OR NARROW VIEW OF MCDONNELL?
We have it from no less an authority than The Washington Post that
the Supreme Court decision in McDonnell v. United States' "left in its
wake a new definition of what constitutes public corruption . . . .
Others have seen the decision as equally significant.3 For example, at
least one circuit court of appeals has stressed its impact on the federal-
state prosecutorial balance.4 Before the case was even decided by the
lower court, lay and legal observers were touting its importance.s
McDonnell is certainly an important decision about federal prosecution
of state and local officials for public corruption. McDonnell's status as
the Court's latest word on corruption makes this Symposium particularly
timely. There are reasons to hesitate before attributing .to the case the
precedential status or generative force of such landmark decisions as
1. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
2. Matt Zapotosky, Rachel Weiner & Rosalind S. Helderman, Prosecutors Will
Drop Cases Against Former Va. Governor Robert McDonnell, Wife, WASH. POST, Sept.
8, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/prosecutors-will-drop-case-
against-former-va-gov-robert-mcdonnell/2016/09/08/al9dc5Oa-6878-1 1e6-ba32-
5a4bf5aad4fa_story.html?utm term-.b5b64a5edbe4.
3. Eric Lipton & Benjamin Weiser, Supreme Court Complicates Corruption Cases
from New York to Illinois, N.Y. TIMEs, June 27, 2016, at A14; see generally Shelley
Murphy, Supreme Court's Corruption Decision Could Affect Mass. Cases, Bos. GLOBE,
July 21, 2016, https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/07/21/supreme-court-decision-
could-affect-corruption-cases-massachusetts/OE5DkfwdfLnKS2VoeuZaal/story.html.
4. United States v. Tavares, 844 F.3d 46, 54, 57 (1st Cir. 2016).
5. See, e.g., Harvey Silverglate, Op-Ed, Politics as Usual Often Isn't a Crime, BOs.
GLOBE, May 6, 2016, https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/05/06/politics-usual-
often-isn-crime/o2NyNsCOFq5ZCq6H6pG51K/story.html; George Will, Virginia's
Former Governor Faces Prison Over Politics, WASH. POsT, Jan. 6, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/viriginias-former-governor-faces-prison-over-
politics/201601/06/2af3ff74-b3e6-11e5-9388-466021d971de story.html?utm term=
.8d91fa343d74.
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McNally v. United StateS6 or Skilling v. United States.7 McDonnell was a
unanimous decision on official corruption. Yet the Court has been
sharply divided over issues of corruption in the closely related area of
campaign finance reform. The decision is mainly focused on a narrow
issue of statutory construction-the meaning of "official act" in the
federal bribery statute.9 Moreover, the Court indicated that McDonnell
could possibly be retried, by a properly instructed jury, on essentially the
facts presented in his original trial.10
I have taken the position elsewhere that McDonnell should be read
narrowly, but I admit that thereare portions of the decision that support a
broader reading." The Court expressed sensitivity to "significant
federalism concerns" in the case. 12 In addition, while the opinion did not
cite Citizens United v. FEC,13 it does contain language, highly similar to
the majority opinion in that case, stressing the importance of
responsiveness by public officials in a representative government to the
concerns of constituents. 14
In this article, I explore the broad reading side: the view that
McDonnell is highly significant both as a guidepost for federal
prosecution of state and local officials for corruption, and as a broader
statement about the nature of representative governance. Was the
decision, for example, Anti-Corruption's Last Stand?15 Accordingly, my
analysis will focus on the potential significance of several key aspects of
McDonnell.
The first, statutory construction, reaches beyond the domain of
anticorruption prosecutions. The case can be seen as an example of the
current Court's hostility toward broad, potentially vague, criminal
statutes. Such statutes raise potential separation of powers questions,
with lawmaking authority seen as delegated to, or usurped by, courts and
6. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) (holding that the mail fraud
statute did not prohibit schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible rights to an honest
and impartial government).
7. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (holding that the honest services
statute only covers bribery and kickback schemes).
8. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014); Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (2012). The Court in Skilling stated that honest service
bribery would "draw[ ] content" from § 201. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 412.
10. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2375 (2016).
11. George D. Brown, McDonnell and the Criminalization ofPolitics, 5 VA. J. CRIM.
L. 1, 32, 36-37 (2017).
12. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2373.
13. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310.
14. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359.
15. See generally Jacob Eisler, McDonnell and Anti-Corruption's Last Stand, 50
U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1619 (2017).
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prosecutors. The phenomenon has often been noted in the anticorruption
field, 16 but it is not limited to that area. As Pratik A. Shah demonstrates,
the current Court views it as a serious problem.17  Others view the
Court's approach to statutory construction issues as having a particularly
strong bite in the anticorruption field and as helping the Court further its
narrow anticorruption agenda.18
A second potentially important dimension of McDonnell is
federalism. Federalism is a general concern of the current Court, and has
been throughout its history.19 However, there has been a long-running
debate among academics about the federal government's role in
prosecuting state and local officials for corrupt behavior.2 0 At times, the
Court has sided with those who feel the states should play the pre-
eminent role in policing themselves. 21  At other times, the Court has
seemed to accept the federal role without question, and perhaps even to
endorse it.2 2
Finally, there is the possibility that McDonnell supports the
"criminalization of politics" critique. The theme of this critique is that
federal anticorruption efforts sometimes harm representative politics by
targeting the reciprocal practices that are an indispensable part of the
American political system.23 The clearest endorsement of this view from
a majority of the current Court is found in Citizens United.24 As noted,
McDonnell contains language that endorses the same view of politics as
highly reciprocal and transactional.2 5 Particularly significant is the
Court's extensive citation to amicus briefs of former government
officials who viewed McDonnell's conviction as a "breathtaking
expansion of public corruption law [that] would likely chill . . . officials'
interactions with the people they serve and thus damage their ability to
effectively perform their duties."26 Indeed, Jacob Eisler sees the case as
16. See generally NORMAN ABRAMS ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 167-71, 280-90 (6th ed. 2015).
17. Pratik A. Shah, The Chief Justice and Statutory Construction: Holding the
Government's Feet to the Fire, 38 CARDOZo L. REv. 573 (2016).
18. See, e.g., Eisler, supra note 15.
19. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 48 (2005); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 648 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995).
20. See generally Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights
Doctrine: Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153 (1994); but see Peter J.
Henning, Federalism and the Federal Prosecution of State and Local Corruption, 92 KY.
L. J. 75 (2003).
21. See, e.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 350 (1987).
22. See, e.g., Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 608 (2004).
23. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 11, at 6-14.
24. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359-60 (2010).
25. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2016).
26. Id. (quoting Brief of Former Federal Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 6, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474)
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a major step towards a unified view of democratic theory and of
anticorruption efforts in all their manifestations.2 7
This article considers whether McDonnell is, in fact, a foundational
decision. Part II considers the treatment of the three major themes in the
amicus briefs filed in the Supreme Court. Part III deals with the actual
Supreme Court decision, focusing on the extent to which the unanimous
opinion should be viewed as largely limited to issues of construction of
particular statutes, as opposed to an intentionally broader treatment of the
issues identified above. Part IV considers the commentary that
McDonnell has generated. Part V examines post-McDonnell
developments in the lower courts. Part VI reviews the Symposium as a
whole-both the discussion of McDonnell and the elaboration of larger
themes.
II. THE AMICUS ARMADA
One of the extraordinary aspects of the McDonnell case is the large
number of groups and individuals that came forward to support the ex-
Governor by filing amicus briefs with the Supreme Court on his behalf.28
This outpouring of support-and the legal arguments advanced-clearly
caught the attention of the Court. It also contributed to the public
perception that McDonnell was a "big" case about politics and the
perception of political corruption. The impressive list of amici includes
the following: ranking federal legal officials, including "[c]ounselors to
the President who have served every President of the United States since
Ronald Reagan," 29 and former attorneys general; over two hundred
"public policy advocates and business leaders"; two groups of law
professors; six former attorneys general of Virginia from both political
parties; current and former members of the Virginia general assembly;
former non-Virginia attorneys general; and various public interest groups
and associated individuals.30 These briefs provide a remarkable
[hereinafter Brief of Former Federal Officials]). Chief Justice Roberts noted that briefs
had also been filed on McDonnell's behalf by former Virginia attorneys general and
former attorneys general from states other than Virginia.
27. See generally Eisler, supra note 15.
28. See, e.g., Brief of Former Federal Officials, supra note 26; see also infra note 30.
Indeed, a number of briefs were filed on McDonnell's behalf when the case was argued
in the Fourth Circuit. See Silverglate, supra note 5.
29. Brief of Former Federal Officials, supra note 26, at 2.
30. Amicus Brief of Former Virginia Attorneys General in Support of Petitioner,
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474) [hereinafter Brief of
Former Virginia Attorneys General]; Amici Curiae Brief of 77 Former State Attorneys
General (Non-Virginia) Supporting Petitioner Robert F. McDonnell, McDonnell v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474) [hereinafter Brief of Former State
Attorneys General]; Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioner,
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474) [hereinafter Brief of
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overview of what the Supreme Court might have done beyond simply
overturning McDonnell's conviction.
A. Statutory Interpretation
As would be expected, these briefs deal extensively with the
statutory interpretation issues present in the case. Some of the analysis
focuses directly on the "official acts" question, including such issues as
the recipient's knowledge of the donor's intent, and the prosecution's
problem of seeming to suggest that every action a governor takes is
official because he is an official. 3 1 However, several of the briefs go
beyond these points in two interesting ways. First, they argue that a
narrow construction here would be consistent with the current Court's
approach to broad criminal statutes. Cases such as Bond v. United
States 32 and United States v. Johnson3 3 link McDonnell to the Court's
vagueness concerns about such statutes.34 A second interesting aspect of
the statutory construction analysis in several briefs is that they tie the
issue presented to concerns of federalism and to the risk of criminalizing
the political process. 35  For example, some amici bring in the First
Amendment.36 They argue that McDonnell's activities on behalf of his
benefactor were a form of political speech, immune from criminal
prosecution. It seems fair to say that the criminalization of politics
argument helped push the Court toward a statutory construction
conclusion-a narrow approach to "official acts"-that it might have
reached anyway.
B. Federalism
One of the advantages of an amicus brief is that the author can take
liberties in advocating legal positions that the parties-constrained by the
Law Professors]; Brief of Amici Curiae Virginia Law Professors in Support of the
Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474) [hereinafter
Brief of Virginia Law Professors]; Brief for Members of the Virginia General Assembly
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355
(2016) (No. 15-474) [hereinafter Brief of Virginia General Assembly].
31. See, e.g., Brief of Former Virginia Attorneys General, supra note 30, at 7.
32. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211 (2011).
33. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
34. See, e.g., Brief of Virginia General Assembly, supra note 30, at 14-15.
35. See, e.g., Brief for Former Virginia Attorneys General, supra note 30, at 12-14;
Brief of Amici Curiae Public Policy Advocates and Business Leaders in Support of
Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474), at 3-13
[hereinafter Brief of Public Policy Advocates].
36. See, e.g., Brief for Former Virginia Attorneys General, supra note 30, at 10-12;
Brief of the American Center for Law and Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 4, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474).
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need to win the case-might not choose to argue. Nowhere is this point
more evident than in some of the McDonnell amicus briefs' discussions
of federalism. The federalism ramifications of national prosecution of
state and local officials for the ways in which they govern have long
been a subject of scholarly debate.37 One can certainly argue over the
national advantages of "clean" government at all levels versus the
advantages of letting states govern themselves, whether well or badly. 38
I would label such debates as largely ones of constitutional policy-the
Constitution may point towards taking a certain position, but does not
compel it.
What seems different about the McDonnell briefs is that they
emphasize questions of what the Constitution requires or forbids. The
first is the question of power. In its amicus brief, the U.S. Justice
Foundation devotes ten pages to the proposition that "there is no
Constitutional power vested in Congress to sanction state and local
corruption." 39  After citing longstanding precedent about "an
indestructible Union composed of indestructible states,"4 0 the brief states
that "nothing could be more vital to the independence and autonomy of
the 50 states than for each state to define the permissible relations,
communications, and contacts between the state's governing officials
and their constituents." 41  Neither the Commerce Clause nor the
Guarantee Clause supplies the national government with power to affect
these relations.42
Some briefs hedge their bets by apparently conceding congressional
power by insisting on a clear statement to displace state law.43 At times,
there is a surprising emphasis on what state law says abouta particular
matter." The brief of Virginia law professors suggests going beyond
notions of clear statements in admittedly valid federal laws. Its treatment
of state laws seems to reflect the view that the states are the ultimate
source of law.45 The brief may, however, stop at the intermediate
position of using state law as the reference point for federal laws. 46
37. Compare Moohr, supra note 20, with Henning, supra note 20.
38. See George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption?-Mail Fraud,
State Law and Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 225, 282-99 (1997) (discussing
the use of state law as a source of fiduciary duties).
39. Brief Amicus Curiae of U.S. Justice Foundation et al. in Support of Petitioner,
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474) [hereinafter Brief of
U.S. Justice Foundation].
40. Id. at 9 (citing Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1869)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 11-17.
43. Brief of the Virginia General Assembly, supra note 30, at 14.
44. Brief of Virginia Law Professors, supra note 30, at 3-4.
45. Id. at 3.
46. Id. at 11.
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Federalism played a role in the McDonnell opinion, whether or not it is
an integral part of the analysis. The First Circuit, in a recent political
corruption case, seized upon the Court's language in emphasizing the
federalism dimensions of the problem before it. 47 The McDonnell briefs
give new life to the debate over federalism and corruption. Furthermore,
they suggest treating it as an open question.
C. The Amicus Briefs and the Political Process
It is doubtful that many of McDonnell's amici would have devoted
the time, effort and resources necessary to file amicus briefs with the
Supreme Court if the case had involved only questions of statutory
construction and federalism. What united and motivated virtually all of
McDonnell's impressive and diverse group of supporters was the view
that his prosecution threatened the political process. They saw the
former Governor as an elected official who had extended courtesies to a
constituent, acts that elected officials perform all the time. This sort of
interaction is not only routine in a representative democracy, it is
essential to such a system. The fact that McDonnell received large sums
of money from someone who wanted to do business with the state either
disappeared from the fact pattern, was dismissed as legal under then
Virginia law, or was subtly elided with receipt of a campaign
contribution. Some excerpts from the briefs may be helpful in
understanding just how important this point was for the amici.
The public policy advocates and business leaders invoked the First
Amendment's "guarantee of robust political participation." 4 8 They stated
that prosecutions such as that of McDonnell "chill political activity."4 9
These are people who deal with the government on a regular basis. The
following quote emphasizes their direct interest: "Amici's longstanding
relationships with public officials will be used against them with no
knowable limiting principle identified in law in advance, to guide their
political conduct."50
The former federal officials, approaching the matter from the other
side of the table, made the same argument:
If allowed to stand, the court of appeals' breathtaking expansion of
public-corruption law would likely chill federal officials' interactions
with the people they serve and thus damage their ability effectively to
perform their duties. The decision below subjects to potential
prosecution numerous routine behaviors that have long been essential
47. United States v. Tavares, 844 F.3d 46, 54-59 (1st Cir. 2016).
48. Brief of Public Policy Advocates, supra note 35, at 10.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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to the day to day functioning of our representative government. To
effectively serve, public officials must interact with the public,
seeking to understand their needs, and learn about their concerns.
Elected officials in particular are expected to advocate, publicize and
implement the goals of the people who elected them. That is, after
all, an essential part of an official's job.5
Elected state officials saw the matter the same way:
The Fourth Circuit's unprecedented broadening of the federal
corruption laws is particularly concerning to Virginia's citizen
legislators. Most hold full-time jobs, and while working they. may
receive benefits, such as meals and token gifts. For example, a
delegate who is also a construction contractor may attend an annual
picnic hosted by one of his company's largest subcontractors.
Sometime after the event, the subcontractor's CEO may reach out to
the delegate about a completely unrelated legislative matter. Again,
until Governor McDonnell's prosecution, no Virginian could have
foreseen that federal authorities might assign criminal liability in
52such a case.
As these quotes suggest, many involved in the political process saw
McDonnell's conviction as a direct threat to them. One might dismiss
lofty rhetoric about saving democracy as thinly disguised self-interest.
Such views, however, represent one strand of an ongoing debate over
what are proper attempts by citizens to influence "their" officials, and the
limits of official responsiveness. 53  Such questions are inherent in a
representative democracy characterized by a high degree of interaction.
Jacob Eisler describes the debate as between, on the one hand, delegate
theory and agonist politics, and, on the other, trustee theory and civic
politics.
54
At the Supreme Court level, the issue has come to a head primarily
in the domain of campaign finance reform. The current majority is
viewed as siding against civic politics, most recently in Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission." In that case, Justice Kennedy wrote
that "[f]avoritism and influence are not. . . avoidable in representative
politics. It is in the nature of an elected representative to favor certain
policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and contributors
51. Brief of Former Federal Officials, supra note 26, at 6.
52. Brief of Virginia General Assembly, supra note 30, at 10-11.
53. David Mills & Robert Weisberg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement in White
Collar Crime, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1371, 1377 (2008).
54. Eisler, supra note 15, at 1643, 1645.
55. See generally ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN's SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014).
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
who support those policies."5 6 McDonnell may reflect similar views.
Let us turn to the unanimous opinion in the case to gauge the impact of
the amicus briefs on the issues identified earlier, and, in particular, on the
political process point of access and ingratiation that lay at the heart of
the former Governor's prosecution.
III. MCDONNELL-BROAD OR NARROW?
Judging by the interest in the case, fueled by the amicus briefs,
McDonnell had the potential to be a groundbreaking decision. The
Supreme Court has handed down a number of important decisions on
official corruption, as opposed to the campaign finance decisions, which
also frequently involve issues of corruption and tend to receive more
scholarly attention.17
Major official corruption cases include United States v. Sun-
Diamond,8 Evans v. United States,59 McCormick v. United States,60
McNally v. United States,6 1 and Skilling v. United States.62  Although
these cases mainly involve statutory construction, they can be seen as
forming a corpus of anticorruption law. McDonnell certainly belongs
among them. The question is whether the case rises to the "bombshell"
63
level of Skilling and McNally, each of which radically cut back on
prosecutors' use of the "honest services" concept.6 4 Let us first consider
the view that McDonnell is a (relatively) narrow decision.
56. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010) (quoting McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). Justice Kennedy also said,
"[i]ngratiation and access .. . are not corruption. " Id. at 360.
57. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118,
122, 126-27 (2010).
58. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 414 (1999)
(holding that "in order to establish a violation of [the federal gratuity statute], the
Government must prove.a link between a thing of value conferred upon a public official
and a specific 'official act"' by that public official).
59. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 290-91 (1992) (holding that "an
affirmative act of inducement by a public official ... is [not] an element of... extortion
'under color of official right' prohibited by the Hobbs Act" (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951)).
60. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 274 (1991) (holding that "a quid pro
quo is . .. necessary for conviction under the Hobbs Act when an official receives a
campaign contribution," irrespective of if the contribution was legitimate). McCormick
involves the electoral context, but not campaign finance regulation.
61. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358-60 (1987) (finding that the mail
fraud statute did not prohibit schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible rights to an
honest and impartial government).
62. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 368 (holding that the honest services
statute "covers only bribery and kickback schemes").
63. ABRAMS, supra note 16, at 341.
64. Prior to McNally, lower federal courts had developed the concept that "fraud"
could include depriving citizens of the intangible right to honest services. McNally, 483
U.S. at 355, 358. McNally eliminated the concept. Id. at 358-60. Congress restored it,
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A. McDonnell as a Straightforward Construction of the English
Language
The core of the McDonnell decision is the Court's construction of
18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3), which states as follows:
(3) the term "official act" means any decision or action on any
question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at
any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any
public official, in such official's official capacity, or in such official's
place of trust or profit.65
The Court attributed substantial elements of formality to all aspects
of the subsection. It first considered the notion of a question, matter,
cause, suit, proceeding and controversy.66 The Court reasoned that the
last four, "cause," "suit," "proceeding," and "controversy," suggest "a
formal exercise of governmental power, such as a lawsuit, hearing, or
administrative determination." 67  It then concluded that the terms
"question" or "matter" should be judged by the (formal) context in which
they appear.66 The Court found the same requirement of formality in the
terms "decision and action." 69 Under this analysis, the Court reasoned
that meeting about a matter, or speaking with interested parties would not
rise to the requisite level of formality.70 "Instead something more is
required: Section 201(a)(3) specifies that the public official must make a
decision or take an action on that question or matter or agree to do so.",71
When it came to applying this construction to McDonnell's
conduct, the Court saw the matter as straightforward. The range of
issues on which he assisted Jonnie Williams did not rise to the level of
formality required to constitute a "cause, suit, etc."72  As for
McDonnell's actions, setting up meetings, hosting an event, or calling
another official to talk about Williams' interests could not be viewed as
taking an action or making a decision. The opinion could easily have
stopped here. The Court had reached the straightforward conclusion that
not every interaction between a citizen and state government is a
elevating the concept from judge-made to statutory status. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 405
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)). In Skilling, the Court narrowed that statute
considerably, on the ground that it presented serious vagueness issues. Id. at 408-09.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (2012).
66. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2368-70 (2016).
67. Id. at 2368.
68. Id. at2368-70
69. Id. at 2370-72.
70. Id.
71. Id.at2370.
72. Id. at 2369-70 (noting that in the fact pattern, there were questions on matters
both focused and concrete).
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"question, matter, etc.," and that not every response by a state official (in
this case the Governor) is a "decision" or "action." The core of the
opinion might be seen as an interpretation of the English language to
reject "the Government's boundless interpretation of the federal bribery
statute."73
If the Court had stopped at the end of what I refer to as its "core"
English language statutory construction, there would essentially be only
one indication that there are special rules when prosecutions of public
officials, and those who deal with them, are involved: the Court's
extensive reliance on Sun-Diamond.74  That case addressed another
portion of 18 U.S.C. § 201: the so-called gratuity offense. Section
201(c) deals with the transfer of things of value to public officials "for or
because of any official act performed or to be performed by such official
or person . . . ."7 6 The Court in Sun-Diamond essentially transformed the
gratuities offense into a form of bribery by requiring a link between the
gift and the official act. The McDonnell Court relied on Sun-Diamond to
bolster its narrow view of "official acts."77 Sun-Diamond had rejected
the possibility that the term could reach so far as to embrace any action
that an official took with respect to general matters pending before him
in some way. 78 The unanimous opinion in Sun-Diamond can be read as
showing a special solicitude for public officials facing a complex
regulatory scheme. McDonnell may reflect the same approach.
The case limits its own reach by making clear that actual
performance of an official act is not required to show § 201 bribery: "[I]t
is enough that the official agree to do so."79 However, McDonnell was
not charged under an agreement theory. The opinion could have
essentially stopped here as well. Because the Court did not conclude its
analysis with agreement theory, there are intimations of a broader
reading and significance of the case.
B. Constitutional Concerns in McDonnell-Federalism and a Political
Process Reading of the Decision
If the opinion had concluded at this point, McDonnell would stand
as a straightforward, unremarkable example of statutory construction:
The term "official acts" cannot extend to all the things that an official
73. Id. at 2375.
74. Id. at 2370 (citing United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398
(1999)).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2012).
76. Id. § 201(c)(1).
77. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2370.
78. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 404-05.
79. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371.
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does. However, the Court did not stop with a rejection based on "text
and precedent"8 0 of the government's "expansive interpretation" 8 ' of the
term. The Court also noted "significant constitutional concerns" with the
government's position to bolster its conclusions.82 However, the opinion
did not specify what these concerns were. The most likely candidates are
federalism and political process concerns. I will first discuss federalism
issues before turning to the question of statutory construction guided by
political process considerations.
In a post-McDonnell decision, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has
cited McDonnell for the proposition that "the Supreme Court has warned
against interpreting federal laws in a manner that . . . involves the Federal
Government in setting standards of good government for local and state
officials."8 3  McDonnell did, indeed, cite "significant federalism
concems." 84 The strongest statement of these concerns is evidenced by
the combined treatment of McNally and Gregory v. Ashcroft.85 Together
these cases stand for the following proposition: A state defines itself as a
sovereign through "the structure of its government and the character of
those who exercise government authority." 86  The McDonnell Court
elaborated by stating that "[t]hat includes the prerogative to regulate the
permissible scope of interactions between state officials and their
constituents."87 These propositions no doubt gladden the hearts of many
of the amici. At the least, the Court's words support a federalism-based
canon of narrow construction of federal anticorruption statutes. Read
broadly, they lay the groundwork for a constitutional revolution: the
invalidation of national attempts to regulate the "character" of those who
govern the co-equal "sovereigns."
Reading McDonnell as primarily a constitutional case would be a
stretch because the Court never suggested that the statutes before it were
unconstitutional. For example, it rejected a vagueness attack on the
federal bribery statute. In McDonnell's case, the Court raised the
possibility of a retrial under the very statutes at issue.89 Perhaps most
significant is the Court's statement that the correct ("more limited")
80. Id. at 2372.
8 1. Id.
82. Id. The Court had earlier briefly referred to "constitutional concerns," but did
not elaborate. Id. at 2367.
83. United States v. Tavares, 844 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 2016) (punctuation altered).
84. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372.
85. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
86. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2373 (emphasis added) (quoting in part Gregory, 501
U.S. at 460).
87. Id
88. Id. at 2375.
89. Id.
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interpretation of "official act" "leaves ample room for prosecuting
corruption. .. ."90 In other words, McDonnell does not change the basic
institutional dynamic of the national government (in the person of United
States Attorneys utilizing broad statutes) acting as the major prosecutor
of state and local government corruption.
This does not mean that things will not be somewhat different post-
McDonnell. The Court's constitutional references cannot have been
asides. What McDonnell may stand for is that concern for the political
process-with its substantial First Amendment overtones-calls for a
narrow. interpretation of those statutes when a prosecution under them
threatens that process. In other words, of more importance than the
federalism dimension is the fact that the Court blended issues of statutory
construction with the question of protecting the political process. As the
Court recognizes, this protection is not unlimited. Gift giving to procure
official acts can extend beyond normal, protected, political interactions. 91
Otherwise, the possibility of a retrial for McDonnell would not make
sense.
Although the statutory outcome in McDonnell was hardly a
complete surprise, the Court might have simply said that "official acts"
cannot mean everything an official does. Sun-Diamond had made it clear
that "official acts" is a limited term that serves to prevent "absurdities" in
the form of overly broad application to things officials do.92 McDonnell
might have amplified this reading by giving examples such as setting up
a meeting or hosting an event, or it could have cited these examples and
added, "because such interactions with constituents are part of the
political process and have constitutional value." The latter seems the
most logical reading of the Court's references to "constitutional
concerns." These concerns were an important component of the
rejection of the government's broad reading of "official acts." The
rejection is followed immediately by the following striking paragraph:
But conscientious public officials arrange meetings for constituents,
contact other officials on their behalf, and include them in events all
the time. The basic compact underlying representative government
assumes that public officials will hear from their constituents and act
appropriately on their concerns-whether it is the union official
worried about a plant closing or the homeowners who wonder why it
took five days to restore power to their neighborhood after a storm.
The Government's position could cast a pall of potential prosecution
over these relationships if the union had given a campaign
90. Id.
91. See id. at 2372-73.
92. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1999).
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contribution in the past or the homeowners invited the official to join
them on their annual outing to the ballgame. Officials might wonder
whether they could respond to even the most commonplace requests
for assistance, and citizens with legitimate concerns might shrink
from participating in democratic discourse.93
The Court's language reflects points made in many of the amicus
briefs.94 More fundamentally, it reflects a view of the political process
set forth in Citizens United.95 This striking similarity raises the question
of whether the Court has imported into corruption prosecutions a view
articulated, albeit by a divided Court, in the context of injunctive
challenges to mainly prophylactic statutes aimed at preventing
corruption.96 A recent article on McDonnell, discussed below, by Jacob
Eisler finds in the case a significant unification of the two contexts and
the further development of a unified view of corruption. 97 ,
Unlike the amici, McDonnell does not cite Citizens United," and it
is hard to believe that the four justices who dissented in that case would
have accepted the decision as a constitutional guide to statutory
construction." Indeed, in the "constitutional" portion of its opinion, the
McDonnell Court backpedaled sharply, stating that neither its analysis
nor, apparently, the citation to amicus briefs that accompanied it suggests
"that the facts of this case typify normal political interaction between
public officials and their constituents." 0 0
93. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372.
94. See, e.g., Brief of Former Federal Officials, supra note 26, at 4-7; Brief for
Former Virginia Attorneys General, supra note 30, at 6.
95. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010).
96. The campaign finance statutes contain criminal provisions, but administrative
enforcement through the Federal Election Commission is the norm. Pre-enforcement
challenges are also frequent and important. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976).
97. See generally Eisler, supra note 15. Professor Teachout has expressed
somewhat similar views. In particular, she regards Sun-Diamond as a significant case
with extensive ramifications. She states that "it set the table for the Court's major
corruption decision in Citizens United." TEACHOUT, supra note 55, at 229.
98. See, e.g., Brief of Former Federal Officials, supra note 26, at 8, 13, 18; Brief for
Former Virginia Attorneys General, supra note 30, at 8; Brief of Law Professors, supra
note 30, at 4-6, 10-14 (all citing Citizens United).
99. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
2355 (2016) (No. 15-474) (Justice Breyer noting his dissent in Citizens United).
100. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372.
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IV. McDONNELL 'S IMPLICATIONS-THE COMMENTATORS' VIEWS
A. The McDonnell Problem
Much of anticorruption law involves interactions between public
officials and their constituents. At the outset, it should be noted that
many prosecutions involve non-elected officials. Because these non-
elected officials do not have "constituents" in the electoral sense, their
dealings with the public should not be shielded by a constitutional
umbrella. Elected officials are potential beneficiaries of McDonnell,
even when they play multiple roles as policymakers and executives.
McDonnell will apply with particular force to cases involving quid pro
quo issues. Prosecutors may now focus their attention on activities
earlier in the chain of conduct.10 ' The presence of an agreement may
take on more importance, including the difficulties of proving an implicit
one. 102 Specificity of performance-a key ingredient of any analysis
based on Sun-Diamond-may call into question prosecutions based on a
stream of benefits theory.10 3 Issues of intent may also play a greater role.
The nature of the outer boundaries of "official acts" such as a
congressman writing municipal officials on congressional letterhead will
be tested. 104
McDonnell certainly will lead to a narrower, more precise judicial
approach to all anticorruption statutes. As a result, United States
Attorneys will likely be more careful in case selection. Defense lawyers
will probably say to the anti-corruption community something on the
order of "you learned to live with Skilling, you can learn to live with
McDonnell." Elsewhere in this symposium, Jennifer Ahearn also
discusses a partial congressional response.o10
B. The Commentators Respond
For a case of potentially great significance, the relative lack of law
review commentary on McDonnell is surprising. I think the Symposium
will help to rectify this situation. As of February 2017, there are two
significant pieces about McDonnell on which focus is merited. Writing
in the Cato Supreme Court Review, Emma Quinn-Judge and Harvey
101. Brown, McDonnell and the Criminalization ofPolitics, supra note 11, at 32.
102. Prosecutors can invoke McDonnell to argue agreements instead of actions.
However, this tactic invites the difficulties of proving an implicit agreement.
103. See George D. Brown, Applying Citizens United to Ordinary Corruption: With
a Note on Blagojevich, McDonnell, and the Criminalization of Politics, 91 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 177, 215-23 (2015) (discussing theory) [hereinafter Applying Citizens United].
104. See United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 97-99 (2d Cir. 1988).
105. See generally Jennifer Ahearn, A Way Forward for Congress on Bribery After
McDonnell, 121 PENN ST. L. REv. 1013 (2017).
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Silverglate critique McDonnell on the grounds that the decision did not
go far enough in curbing federal prosecutions of state and local
officials.106  The crux of their argument is summed up in their title:
McDonnell Fails to Draw a Clear Line for Federal Prosecution of State
Officials.107  Their thesis is essentially a restatement of the
criminalization critique, and related arguments, coupled with a close
reading of the case, which leads to the conclusion that not much has
changed. 108
An important element of the authors' critique is that the concept of
"honest services" still drives much of federal anticorruption law, and that
the Supreme Court's decision in Skilling did not succeed in cutting it
back in a meaningful way.' 09 McDonnell purported to adopt a more
"bounded"110 interpretation of the bribery statute, which gives "content"
to honest services fraud. Quinn-Judge and Silverglate note that, since the
Hobbs Act is construed as containing a bribery component, definitional
issues have broad implications.' Their main point is that the definition
of official act "leaves room for substantial expansion."' 12 The authors
criticize the concept of the sphere of official action as including
"qualifying step[s]."1 13 More importantly, they see a large flaw in the
Court's extension of performing an official act to exerting pressure or
giving advice.1 14  Given the fact that the favors McDonnell did for
Williams might seem to some as an example of such action, this criticism
seems particularly strong.
The authors conclude that the "stream of benefits" theory may now
be vulnerable." 5  However, they emphasize the possibility that lower
courts will continue "the history of expansive readings of public
corruption statutes . ."116 The authors also see other post-Skilling
problems as untouched by McDonnell, including the role of part-time
officials, and the presence of whatever fiduciary duties federal, as
opposed to state, law imposes.1 7 The article concludes with familiar
106. See generally Emma Quinn-Judge & Harvey A. Silverglate, Tawdry or Corrupt?
McDonnell Fails to Draw a Clear Line for Federal Prosecution of State Officials, 2016
CATO S. CT. REv. 189 (2016).
107. Id.
108. See generally id.
109. Id at 191-96.
110. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2368 (2016).
111. Quinn-Judge & Silverglate, supra note 106, at 195-96.
112. Id. at 204.
113. Id. at 205.
114. Id at 205-07 (citing McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371).
115. Id. at 207-08.
116. Id. at 208.
117. Id. at 209-13.
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aspects of the criminalization critique, including vagueness,' 8
prosecutorial discretion,119 and federalism.1 20 In sum, Quinn-Judge and
Silverglate view McDonnell as a double missed opportunity: for the
Court to clear up post-Skilling ambiguities; and for the criminalization
critique to become a central theme in American anticorruption law.
Jacob Eisler's important work, McDonnell and Anti-Corruption's
Last Stand, criticizes McDonnell, but from a totally different
perspective.121 Eisler sees the Court's holding on official corruption as
demonstrating "surprising tolerance for sleazy political behavior ....
He argues that "[t]he Court's tolerance for self-interested representative
behavior reached a high-water mark. . ." in McDonnell.12 3  Eisler
approaches this issue from a perspective of political ideology. He
believes that representatives are obliged to discharge their roles in a
public-minded manner. He favors "theories that claim that
representatives should disinterestedly advance the public good in their
decision-making. The trustee approach to representation asserts that
representatives should advance the broader interests of the polity, rather
than directly implement the desires of constituents towards whom they
are partial."' 24
The Supreme Court's decisions on official corruption, according to
Eisler, point in the opposite direction. Eisler uses the concept of quid pro
quo-capable of broad or narrow applications-as the lynchpin of his
analysis.1 2 5 Expansive interpretations of quid pro quo will force "public
officials to consider the public good." 26 The exact opposite happened in
McDonnell. "By narrowing the breadth of a central concept in the
corruption formula, the quo element of official conduct, and arguing that
this narrowness springs from the very nature of democratic
representation, the Court stakes out a minimalist position on the
expectations for public integrity. .. "2 The decision thus "reduces the
breadth of representative behavior identified as corrupt."l28 For Eisler, a
particularly troubling aspect of McDonnell is the suggestion that his
"conduct might be acceptable political practice." 29
118. Id. at 214-15.
119. Id. at 215-17.
120. Id. at 216-18.
121. Eisler, supra note 15.
122. Id. at 1622.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1645.
125. Id. at 1627-32.
126. Id. at 1632.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1640.
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The difficulty of drafting anticorruption measures is well known. 13 0
Eisler advocates for broad measures, in part to protect citizens who do
not have political power, and who are at a disadvantage when those who
have such power join with those who can pay for its use to their benefit.
He argues, "anti-corruption statutes could be legitimately interpreted in a
manner that permits broad sweep in order to encourage public-
mindedness in representative behavior. In McDonnell, this would permit
reading 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) to include the conduct at issue as official
,,131
action.
Eisler not only criticizes McDonnell; he sees it as the culmination of
a longstanding tendency by the Court to read anticorruption statutes
narrowly. 132 Sun-Diamond is the leading example. 133 "By illuminating
the Court's view of politics," he reasons, "McDonnell suggests that
judicial hostility towards civic anti-corruption is an expression of the
Court's substantive commitments rather than merely an incidental by-
product of neutral application of doctrinal principles."1 34 Eisler notes
that this pronounced tendency in official corruption law has implications
for campaign finance law as well.135
Comparing Eisler's article with that of Quinn-Judge and Silverglate
is a stimulating experience. For the latter authors, McDonnell is neither a
big case, nor one which recognizes the realities of political life. From
Eisler's perspective, it is, indeed, a big case, but one which permits the
realities of political life to cross the line into what would otherwise be
criminal behavior. These two articles represent the major commentary
on McDonnell to date.
Like Quinn-Judge and Silverglate, a Comment in the Harvard Law
Review concludes that the limits of McDonnell can be easily
circumvented by "prosecutions based on theories of access and
influence... ."136 The Comment criticizes the Court for focusing on the
quo while ignoring other statutory elements that protect against
vagueness. 137 The Comment also criticizes the Court for ignoring what
130. See generally Lisa Kern Griffin, Adaptation and Resiliency in Legal Systems:
The Federal Common Law Crime of Corruption, 89 N.C. L. REv. 1815 (2011); see also
Eisler, supra note 15, at 1623 n. 11 (discussing possible "virtue to anti-corruption laws
which have a level of indeterminacy .....
131. Eisler, supra note 15, at 1666.
132. Id. at 1633-34.
133. Id at 1636-37.
134. Id. at 1639.
135. Id. at 1655-58.
136. Case Comment, III. Federal Statutes and Regulations: Federal Corruption
Statutes-Federal Corruption Statutes-Bribery-Definition of "Official Act"-
McDonnell v. United States, 130 HARV. L. REv. 467, 476 (2016). In his article on
statutory construction, Pratik A. Shah, supra note 17, discusses McDonnell briefly.
137. 130 HARV. L. REv. at 474.
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the author sees as the protections against arbitrary prosecutions
established by Skilling.13 8 Although perhaps not entirely consistent, the
Comment's main thrust seems to be that, in the quest to delineate
"politics from bribes[,]"l3 9 the Court has adopted a "play-to-pay
rhetoric."1 4 0
A recent Note in the Fordham Law Review focuses on the
relationship between the bribery and extortion statutes that have played a
major role in federal prosecution of state and local officials, including 18
U.S.C. § 666.141 The author views McDonnell as applying a narrow
approach to quid pro quo requirements as well as to specific statutory
references to "official acts." 4 2 He expresses concern that the "stream of
benefits" theory may be in jeopardy because it "does not require the
contemplation of a specific official action at the time the agreement is
made."1 4 3  On the other hand, the Note discusses the possibility that
section 666 will assume a greater role.144
McDonnell also plays a role in Professor Deborah Hellman's
excellent forthcoming article, A Theory of Bribery.145  She sees
McDonnell as a case that "hints at a theory of bribery and at bribery's
relation to democracy, [but] offers little more than that."1 4 6 A summary
of her theory of bribery is that "when a public official agrees to exchange
an official act for something external to the domain of politics, this
exchange constitutes bribery." 147 Unfortunately for McDonnell fans, the
bulk of her article is devoted to campaign finance. 148 Official corruption
may, of course, play a larger role in later iterations.1 49 At the end of the
draft on which this analysis is based, she returns to McDonnell, and
138. Id. at 473.
139. Id. at 474.
140. Id. at 476.
141. Adam Minchew, Note, Who Put the Quo in Quid Pro Quo?: Why Courts Should
Apply McDonnell's "Official Act" Definition Narrowly, 85 FORDHAM L. REv. 1793, 1796
(2017).
142. Id at 1817-18.
143. Id at 1808. For a discussion of stream of benefits generally, see Applying
Citizens United, supra note 103, at 216-19.
144. Id. at 1824. For an early analysis of this statute and its potential growth, see
George Brown, Stealth Statute - Corruption, The Spending Power, and the Rise of 18
U.S C. § 666, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 247, 311-12 (1998).
145. Deborah Hellman, A Theory of Bribery, CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(available on SSRN). Subsequent page citations are to an earlier version of the article,
Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2016-47, UNIV. OF VA. SCH.
OF LAW (August 2016).
146. Id. at 5.
147. Id. at 6.
148. See, e.g., id at 10-20, 34-40.
149. For a discussion of the relationship between the two areas, see generally Eisler,
supra note 15, at 1655-58 (applying Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359-60
(2010)).
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pinpoints the central question as "[i]s the granting of access an official
act." 50 Professor Hellman reads the McDonnell opinion as suggesting a
negative answer.
V. THE JUDICIAL REACTION TO MCDONNELL
There is certainly widespread awareness of McDonnell among
bench and bar, extending even to the state level.151 Immediately after the
case was decided, federal defendants, particularly in corruption cases,
rushed to cite it.152 As of March 2017, there are at least thirty citations to
it in cases at various stages of litigation."'3 There is no doubt more to
come. Many of the cases involve guilty verdicts that were handed down
prior to McDonnell and its emphasis on jury instructions. As the courts
of appeals are only beginning to play an important role, it is perhaps too
early to discern any general trend or trends. However, judicial reaction
suggests that while McDonnell will have some impact, most corruption
cases will remain unaffected.
Notably, the overwhelming response of courts confronted with
McDonnell objections is to find that the conduct in question constituted
an official act.154 In United States v. Stevenson,1ss the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a legislator's proposing of legislation is an
official act.1 56 In United States v. Bills,1 57 the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois held that McDonnell's criteria were met
when a city official who was a member of a selection committee voted
for, and persuaded other members of the committee to vote for, a
benefactor.' 5 8  Some of these holdings have come despite broad jury
instructions that would not survive McDonnell. For example, in United
States v. Fattah,159 the issue was a promise by a member of an
appropriations committee to obtain an appropriation.' 60  The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania described
150. Hellman, supra note 145, at 43.
151. State v. Holle, 379 P.3d 197, 207 (Ariz. 2016) (noting McDonnell's rejection of
broad construction of a criminal statute). For an example of McDonnell's possible
influence on future cases, see Dan Packel, Feds Could Skirt McDonnell in Charges
against Philly DA, Law360, https://www.1aw360.com/articles/905308/feds-could-skirt-
mcdonnell-in-charges-against-philly-da (last visited April 7, 2017).
152. Lipton & Weiser, supra note 3.
153. See, e.g., United States v. Silver, 184 F. Supp. 3d 33 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Stevenson, 660 F. App'x 4, 7 (2d Cir. 2016).
155. United States v. Stevenson, 660 F. App'x 4 (2d Cir. 2016).
156. See id. at 7, 7 n.1.
157. United States v. Bills, No. 1:14-cr-00135, 2016 WL 4528075 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29,
2016).
158. Id at *3.
159. United States v. Fattah, No. 15-346, 2016 WL 7839022 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2016).
160. Id at *2-10.
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this as a "quintessential" official act, and held that jury instructions that
went beyond McDonnell were harmless errors. 161
I believe that these cases represent the prevailing judicial trend: an
accommodation with McDonnell, rather than a view of it as a radical
change in the rules. Nonetheless, there are cases that point the other
way, such as the high-profile case of former New York Assembly
Speaker Sheldon Silver.16 2 Silver backed a number of actions in favor of
a benefactor, some of which clearly met McDonnell's criteria, such as
proposing state grants. However, he also helped the benefactor's
children get jobs, both public and private, and met with the benefactor.
The quid took the form of referrals to a law firm to which Silver was of
counsel. 163 After Silver's conviction, the Southern District of New York
granted partial post-conviction relief pending appeal. The court reasoned
that the jury instructions did not track the McDonnell standard, and that
there was "a substantial question whether, in light of McDonnell, the
charge was in error, and if so, whether the error was harmless."l64
In August 2016, Silver appealed his conviction to the Second
Circuit.'6 5  He rejected the governments allegations of quid pro quos,
referring to them instead as "routine political courtesies."' 66  Not
surprisingly, Silver's brief relies extensively on McDonnell.167  He
stresses McDonnell's view of "officials acts" as encompassing only
"formal exercise[s] of governmental power."l 68 Silver appeared to have
rendered assistance through his powerful position in state government to
a doctor and to real estate developers. His argument focused on the jury
instructions, which adopted a significantly broader view of official action
than McDonnell.169  According to Silver's brief, the instruction on
official action "came nowhere close to conveying the current governing
law" as "McDonnell requires 'a formal exercise of governmental power'
akin to a lawsuit, hearing, or agency determination."1 7 0 Silver argued
that "[n]othing in the jury charge remotely conveyed that concept" and
the "district court's expansive instruction more closely resemble[d] the
one McDonnell rejected - that 'official acts' include any 'acts that a
161. Id. at *14.
162. See United States v. Silver, 184 F. Supp. 3d 33 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
163. See id at 38-41.
164. United States v. Silver, No. 15-CR-093, 2016 WL 4472929, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 25, 2016).
165. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 1, United States v. Silver, No. 16-1615 (2d Cir.
Aug. 31, 2016).
166. Id.
167. For example, Silver's brief lists citations to McDonnell in the table of authorities
as passim. Id. at iii.
168. Id at 30.
169. Id. at 32-36.
170. Id. at 33 (emphasis omitted).
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public official customarily performs."'17  In response, the government
argued that the jury instructions were sufficiently close to McDonnell
and that the conviction should stand.1 72 Alternatively, the government
argued that any error on this issue was harmless.1 73
In another example of this approach, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania described McDonnell as announcing "a
major change in the legal landscape."174 The court released a public
corruption defendant pending appeal because the jury instructions did not
fit McDonnell and presented a substantial federal question. 175 The court,
however, thought that any error was harmless.17 6
In sum, the full impact of McDonnell is perhaps not yet clear. In
the heartland of public corruption, courts are highly sensitive to its
requirements of formality and official nature. More broadly, McDonnell
is having some impact as a statutory constitution case. In this area,
however, it hardly stands alone. 77 At the moment, McDonnell looks like
an important case, but hardly a revolutionary one.
VI. LESSONS FROM THE SYMPOSIUM-THE FEDERAL ANTICORRUPTION
ENTERPRISE GOING FORWARD
The Symposium offers a wide array of views about McDonnell and
its impact. Many participants viewed the decision's impact as highly
uncertain. One can conclude that McDonnell probably rules out
prosecutions in which the quo is only access, but its further reach is yet
to be determined. As Arlo Devlin-Brown points out in the introduction,
many pending cases involve McDonnell's application to convictions
secured before it was decided. 78
The critics of the Court's decision attacked it on both specific
grounds and on broader anti-corruption considerations. As to the former,
McDonnell was seen as possibly condoning the sale of meetings.
Professor Kathleen Clark criticized the Court for not focusing enough on
171. Id.
172. Brief for Appellee at 27-30, United States v. Silver, No. 16-1615 (2d Cir. Nov.
2016).
173. Id. at 30-40.
174. United States v. Vederman, No. 15-346-2, 2016 WL 7826696, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 21, 2016).
175. Id. at *2.
176. Id. See also United States v. Chin, No. 14-10363-RGS, 2016 WL 5842271, at
*3-5 (D. Mass. Oct. 4, 2016) (citing McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372-
73 (2016) (dismissing indictment on vagueness grounds)).
177. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); Yates v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015); Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211 (2011); see generally
Shah, supra note 17.
178. Arlo Devlin-Brown & Stephen Dee, The Shifting Sands of Public Corruption,
121 PENN. ST. L. REv. 979, 985 (2017).
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all of section 201, particularly on its use of "corruptly." On a broader
level, Professor Clark expressed concern about the Court's seemingly lax
attitude towards corruption.17 9
Another important theme of the Symposium was that of federalism.
Speakers viewed the Court as deeply committed to federalism values,
although critics also referenced the Court's penchant for narrow statutory
construction, concerns about prosecutorial discretion, and a somewhat
jaded view of access180 as seen in Citizens United.'81 A possible broader
role for the state emerged in the discussion of civil remedies for
corruption as opposed to federal criminal prosecution.1 82
In sum, the Symposium explores many facets of McDonnell, but
leaves the attendee-reader with the sense that the decision is essentially
ambiguous. The majority view was probably that McDonnell does not
portend a sea change, but is rather a lens through which many anti-
corruption issues can be viewed. Accordingly, the decision's uncertain
status reflects two fundamental ambiguities inherent in the subject
matter: first is federal criminal prosecution the best way to deal with a
problem whose borders may extend beyond the criminal law; second, if
the federal role is circumscribed, would the states play not just a larger
but a different role in dealing with corruption through mechanisms that
go beyond the criminal law?
179. Kathleen Clark, Professor, Wash. Univ. School of Law, Narrowing and
Distorting Our Anticorruption Laws at the Penn State Law Review Symposium: Breach
of the Public (Dis)Trust: Political Corruption and Government Ethics in 2017 (Mar. 17,
2017).
180. Lance Cole et al., Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? A Panel Discussion on the
Regulation ofPolitical Corruption, 121 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1027, 1031-33 (2017).
181. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Cole et al., supra note 182, at
1041.
182. Cole et al., supra note 182, at 1035
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